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AUSTRIAN MANIFESTO  
AGAINST FRANCE  
1813



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# *Austrian Declaration*

AGAINST

FRANCE.

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AUG. 1813.

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## MANIFESTO

OF HIS MAJESTY THE EMPEROR OF AUSTRIA, KING OF  
HUNGARY AND BOHEMIA.

THE Austrian Monarchy has been compelled by its situation, by its various connections with the other Powers, and its importance in the Confederacy of European States, to engage in most of those wars which have ravaged Europe for upwards of twenty years. Throughout the progress of these arduous struggles, the same political principle has invariably directed his Imperial Majesty. A lover of peace from a sense of duty, from his own natural feelings, and from attachment to his people,—free from all ambitious thoughts of conquest and aggrandisement,—his Majesty has only taken up arms when called by the urgent necessity of self-preservation, by an anxiety for the fate of contiguous States inseparable from his own, or by the danger of beholding *the entire social system of Europe a prey to a lawless and absolute Power*. To promote justice and order has been the object of his Majesty's life and reign; for these alone has Austria contended. If, in these frequently unsuccessful contests, deep wounds have been inflicted on the monarchy, still his Majesty had the consolation to reflect, that the fate of his empire had not been

hazarded upon needless and violent enterprises ; that all his decisions were justifiable before God, his People, his Contemporaries, and Posterity.

Notwithstanding the most ample preparations, the war in 1809 would have brought the State to ruin, had not the ever-memorable bravery of the army, and the spirit of true patriotism which animated all parts of the monarchy, overbalanced every adverse occurrence. The honour of the nation, and its antient renown in arms, were happily upheld during all the mischances of this war : but valuable provinces were lost ; and Austria, by the cession of the countries bordering upon the Adriatic, was deprived of all share in maritime commerce, one of the most efficient means of promoting her industry ; a blow which would have been still more sensibly felt, had not, at the same time, the whole Continent been closed by *a general and destructive System, preventing all commercial intercourse, and almost suspending all communication amongst nations.*

The progress and result of this war fully satisfied his Majesty, that in the obvious impossibility of an immediate and thorough improvement of the political condition of Europe, shaken as it was to its very foundation, the exertions of individual States in their own defence, instead of setting bounds to the general distress, would only tend to destroy the little strength they still retained, would hasten the fall of the whole, and even destroy all hopes of future and better times. Under this conviction, his Majesty foresaw the important advantage that would result from a Peace, which, if secured for some years, might check this overgrown and hitherto irresistible Power ; might allow his monarchy that repose which was indispensable to the restoration of his finances and his army ; and, at the same time, procure to the neighbouring States a period of relaxation, which, if improved with prudence and activity, might prepare the way to more fortunate times. Such a Peace, under the existing circumstances of danger, was only to be obtained by an extraordinary effort. The Emperor was sensible of it, and made this effort. For the preservation of the empire, for the most sacred interests of mankind,—as a security against immeasurable evils, as a pledge of a better

order of things,—his Majesty sacrificed what was dearest to his heart. With this view, exalted above all common scruples, armed against every misconstruction of the moment, an alliance was formed, which was intended, by a sense of some security, to reanimate the weaker and more suffering party, after the miseries of an unsuccessful struggle,—to incline the stronger and victorious one to a course of moderation and justice, without which the community of States can only be considered as a community of misery.

His Majesty was the more justified in these expectations, because, at the time of the consummation of this union, the Emperor Napoleon had attained that point of his career, when the preservation of his conquests was a more natural and desirable object than a restless struggle after new possessions. Any farther extension of his dominions, long since outstretching their proper limits, was attended with evident danger, not only to France, already sinking under the burthen of his conquests, but even to his own real personal interest. What his authority gained in extent, it necessarily lost in point of security. By an union with the most antient Imperial Family in Christendom, the edifice of his greatness acquired, in the eyes of the French nation and of the world, such an addition of strength and perfection, that any ulterior scheme of aggrandisement must only weaken and destroy its stability. What France, what Europe, what so many oppressed and despairing nations earnestly demanded of Heaven, a sound policy prescribed to the triumphant ruler as a law of self-preservation; and it was allowed to hope that so many great and united motives would prevail over the ambition of an individual.

If these flattering prospects were destroyed, it is not to be imputed to Austria. After many years' fruitless exertions, after boundless sacrifices of every description, there existed sufficient motives for the attempt to procure a better order of things by confidence and concession, when streams of blood had hitherto produced nothing but misery and destruction; nor can his Majesty ever regret that he has been induced to attempt it.

The year 1810 was not yet closed; the war still raged in Spain; the people of Germany had scarce been allowed a sufficient time to recover from the devastations of the two former wars,—when, in an evil hour, the Emperor Napoleon resolved to unite a considerable portion of the North of Germany with the mass of Countries which bore the name of the French Empire, and to rob the antient free commercial cities of Hamburgh, Bremen, and Lubeck, first of their political, and shortly after of their commercial existence, and, with that, of their means of subsistence. This violent step was adopted—without even any plausible pretensions, in contempt of every decent form, without any previous declaration, or communication with any other Cabinet—*under the arbitrary and futile pretext, that the war with England required it.*

This cruel System, which was intended to destroy the Commerce of the World, at the expense of the independence, the prosperity, the rights and dignity, and in utter ruin of the public and private property of all the Continental Powers, was pursued with unrelenting severity, in the vain expectation of forcing a result, which, had it not fortunately proved unattainable, would have plunged Europe, for a long time to come, into a state of poverty, impotence, and barbarity!

The Decree by which a new French dominion was established on the German Coasts, under the title of a Thirty-second Military Division, was in itself sufficiently calculated to raise the suspicions of the adjoining States; and it was the more alarming to them as the forerunner of future and greater dangers. By this Decree it became evident, that the system which had been created in France (although previously transgressed, yet still proclaimed to be in existence)—the system of the *pretended natural limits of the French Empire*—was, without any farther justification or explanation, overthrown, and even the Emperor's arbitrary acts were in the same arbitrary manner annihilated. Neither the Princes of the Rhenish Confederacy, nor the kingdom of Westphalia, no territory, great or small, was spared in the accomplishment of this dreadful usurpation. The boundary—drawn apparently by blind caprice, without either rule or plan,



without any consideration of antient or more recent political relations—intersected rivers and Countries, cut off the Middle and Southern States of Germany from all connection with the German Sea, passed the Elbe, separated Denmark from Germany, laid its pretensions even to the Baltic, and seemed to be rapidly approaching the line of Prussian fortresses still occupied on the Oder; and so little did this act of usurpation (however powerfully it affected all rights and possessions, all geographic, political, and military lines of demarcation) carry with it a character of determinate and complete accession of territory, that it was impossible to view it in any other light than as a forerunner of still greater usurpations, by which one half of Germany was to become a French Province, and the Emperor Napoleon the absolute Ruler of the Continent.

To Russia and Prussia this unnatural extension of the French territory could not fail of producing the most serious alarm. The latter, surrounded on all sides, no longer capable of free action, deprived of every means of obtaining fresh strength, appeared hastening to its dissolution. Russia, already in fear for her western frontier, by the conversion of the city of Dantzic (declared a free city by the Treaty of Tilsit) into a French military port, and of *a great part of Poland into a French province*, could not but see, in the advance of the French dominion along the sea coast, and in the new chains prepared for Prussia, the imminent danger of her German and Polish possessions. From this moment, therefore, the rupture between France and Russia was as good as decided.

Not without deep and just anxiety did Austria observe the storm which was gathering. The scene of hostilities would in every case be contiguous to her Provinces; which, owing to the necessary reform in the financial system which had cramped the restoration of her military means, were in a very defenceless state. In a higher point of view, the struggle which awaited Russia appeared still more doubtful, as it commenced under the same unfavourable conjuncture of affairs, with the same want of co-operation on the part of other Powers, and with the same disproportion in their relative means; consequently, was just as

hopeless as all former struggles of the same nature. His Majesty the Emperor made every effort in his power, by friendly mediation with both parties, to avert the impending storm. No human judgment could at that time foresee that the period was so near at hand, when the failure of these friendly attempts should prove more injurious to the Emperor Napoleon than to his opponents. Thus, however, it was resolved by the wisdom of Providence.

When the commencement of hostilities was no longer doubtful, his Majesty was compelled to have recourse to measures which, in so unnatural and dangerous a conjuncture, might combine his own security with just considerations for the real interests of neighbouring States. The system of unarmed inaction, the only neutrality which the Emperor Napoleon, according to his own declarations, would have permitted, was by every sound maxim of policy wholly inadmissible, and would at last have proved only a vain endeavour to shrink from the approaching trial. A power so important as Austria could not renounce all participation in the interests of Europe; nor could she place herself in a situation in which, equally ineffective in peace or war, she would lose her voice and influence in all great negotiations, without acquiring any guarantee for the security of her own frontier. To prepare for war against France would have been, under the existing circumstances, as little consonant with equity as with prudence. The Emperor Napoleon had given his Majesty no personal ground for hostile proceedings; and the prospect of attaining many beneficial results, by a skilful employment of the established friendly relations, by confidential representations and by conciliatory councils, had not yet been abandoned as hopeless. And with regard to the immediate interest of the State, such a resolution would inevitably have been attended with this consequence—that the Austrian territory would have become the first and principal seat of war; which, with its well-known deficiency of means of defence, could in a short time have overthrown the monarchy.

In this painful situation, his Majesty had no other resource than to take the field on the side of France. To take up arms

for France, in the real sense of the word, would have been a measure not only in contradiction with the duties and principles of the Emperor, but even with the repeated declarations of his Cabinet, which had, without any reserve, disapproved of this war. On the signature of the Treaty of the 12th of March, 1812, his Majesty proceeded upon two distinct principles:—the first, as is proved by the words of the Treaty, was to leave no means untried which might sooner or later obtain a peace; the other was to place himself, internally and externally, in a position which, if it should prove impossible to effect a peace, or in case the turn of the war should render decisive measures on his part necessary, would enable Austria to act with independence; and in either of these cases, to adopt the measures which a just and wise policy should prescribe. Upon this principle it was that only a fixed and comparatively small part of the army was destined to co-operate in the war; the other military resources, at that time in a state of readiness, or that still remained to be prepared, were not called forth for the prosecution of this war. By a kind of tacit agreement between the Belligerents, the Austrian territory was even treated as neutral. The real end and views of the system adopted by his Majesty could not escape the notice of France, Russia, or any intelligent observer.

The campaign of 1812 furnished a memorable example of the failure of an undertaking supported by gigantic powers, conducted by a Captain of the first rank, when, in the confidence of great military talents, he despises the rules of prudence, and out-steps the bounds of Nature. The illusion of glory carried the Emperor Napoleon into the heart of the Russian Empire; and a false political view of things induced him to imagine that he should dictate a peace in Moscow, should cripple the Russian Power for half a century, and then return victorious. When the magnanimous constancy of the Emperor of Russia, the glorious deeds of his warriors, and the unshaken fidelity of his people, put an end to this dream, it was too late to repent it with impunity. The whole French army was scattered and destroyed: in less than four months we have seen the theatre of war transferred from the Dnieper and the Dwina to the Oder and the Elbe.

This rapid and extraordinary change of fortune was the forerunner of an important revolution in all the political relations of Europe. The confederacy of Russia, Great Britain, and Sweden, presented a point of union to all neighbouring States. Prussia, whom report had long declared determined to risk all, to prefer even the danger of immediate political destruction to the lingering sufferings of continued oppression, seized the favourable moment, and threw herself into the arms of the Allies. Many greater and smaller Princes of Germany were ready to do the same. Everywhere the ardent desires of the people anticipated the regular proceedings of their Governments. Their impatience to live in independence, and under their own laws, the sentiment of wounded national honour, and the hatred of a foreign dominion, broke out in bright flames on all sides.

His Majesty the Emperor, too intelligent not to consider this change of affairs as the natural and necessary consequence of a previous violent political convulsion, and too just to view it in anger, was solely bent upon securing, by deep-digested and well-combined measures, the real and permanent interest of the European Commonwealth. Already, in the beginning of December, considerable steps had been taken on the part of the Austrian Cabinet, in order to dispose the Emperor Napoleon to quiet and peaceful policy, on grounds which equally interested the world and his own welfare. These steps were from time to time renewed and enforced. Hopes had been entertained that the impression of last year's campaign, the recollection of the fruitless sacrifice of an immense army, the severe measures of every description that would be necessary to replace that loss,—*the decided disinclination of France, and of all those nations connected with her, to a war which, without any prospect of future indemnification, exhausted and ruined her internal strength*,—that, lastly, even a calm reflection on the doubtful issue of this new and highly imminent crisis, would move the Emperor to listen to the representations of Austria. The tone of these representations was carefully adapted to the circumstances of the times; serious as the greatness of the object, moderate as the desire of a favourable issue, and as the existing friendly relations required.

That overtures flowing from so pure a motive should be decidedly rejected, could not certainly be foreseen. But the manner in which they were received, and, still more, the striking contrast between the sentiments entertained by Austria and the whole conduct of the Emperor Napoleon, to the period of these unsuccessful endeavours for peace, soon destroyed the best hopes that were entertained. Instead of endeavouring, by a moderate language, to improve at least our view of the future, and to lessen the general despondency, it was on every occasion solemnly declared, before the highest Authorities in France, that the Emperor would hear of no proposition for peace that should violate the integrity of the French Empire, in the French sense of the word, or that should make any pretension to the arbitrarily incorporated Provinces.

At the same time, eventual conditions, with which this self-created boundary did not even appear to have any relation, were spoken of, at one time menacing indignation, at another with bitter contempt; as if it had not been possible to declare in terms sufficiently distinct, the resolution of the Emperor Napoleon, NOT TO MAKE TO THE REPOSE OF THE WORLD EVEN ONE SINGLE NOMINAL SACRIFICE.

These hostile demonstrations were attended with this particular mortification to Austria, that they placed even the invitations to peace, which this Cabinet, with the knowledge and apparent consent of France, made to other Courts, in a false and highly disadvantageous light. The Sovereigns united against France, instead of any answer to Austria's propositions for negotiation, and her offers of mediation, laid before her the public declarations of the French Emperor. *And when, in the month of March, his Majesty sent a Minister to London, to invite England to share in a negotiation for peace, the British Ministry replied, "that they would not believe Austria still entertained any hopes of peace, when the Emperor Napoleon had in the mean time expressed sentiments which could only tend to the perpetuation of war;" a declaration which was the more painful to his Majesty the more it was just and well founded.*

Austria, however, did not upon this account cease to impress,

in more forcible and distinct terms, the necessity of peace upon the mind of the Emperor of France; directed in all her measures by this principle, that, *as all order and balance of power in Europe had been destroyed by the boundless superiority of France, no real peace was to be expected, unless that superiority were diminished.* His Majesty in the mean time adopted every necessary measure to strengthen and concentrate his armies; sensible that Austria must be prepared for war, if her mediation were not to be entirely unavailing. His Imperial Majesty had moreover been long since persuaded, that the probability of an immediate share in the war should no longer be excluded from his calculations. The actual state of things could not be continued; of this the Emperor was convinced: this conviction was the mainspring of his actions, and was naturally strengthened by the failure of any attempt to procure a peace. The result was apparent. By one means or the other, either by negotiation or by force of arms, a new state of things must be effected.

The Emperor Napoleon was not only aware of the Austrian preparations for war, but even acknowledged them as necessary, and justified them in more than one instance. He had sufficient reason to believe that his Majesty the Emperor, at so decisive a period for the fate of the whole world, would lay aside all personal and momentary feelings, would alone consult the lasting welfare of Austria, and of the Countries by which she is surrounded, and would resolve nothing but what this great motive should impose as a duty upon him. The Austrian Cabinet had never expressed itself in terms that would warrant any other construction; and yet the French did not only acknowledge that the Austrian mediation could only be an armed mediation, but declared, upon more than one occasion, that Austria, under existing circumstances, ought no longer to confine herself to act a secondary part, but should appear in force upon the stage, and decide as a great and independent Power. Whatever the French Government could either hope or fear from Austria, this acknowledgment was of itself a previous justification of the whole intended and hitherto adopted measures of his Imperial Majesty.

Thus far were circumstances developed, when the Emperor

Napoleon left Paris, in order to make head against the progress of the Allied Armies. Even their enemies have done homage to the valour of the Russian and Prussian troops in the sanguinary actions of the month of May. That, however, the result of this first period of the campaign was not more favourable to them, was owing partly to the great numerical superiority of the French force, and to the universally acknowledged military talents of their leader, and partly to the political combinations by which the Allied Sovereigns were guided in all their undertakings. They acted under the just supposition, that a cause like the one in which they were engaged could not possibly be confined to themselves; that sooner or later, whether successful or unfortunate, every State which still preserved a shadow of independence must join their confederacy, every independent army must act with them. They therefore did not allow further scope to the bravery of their troops than the moment required, and preserved a considerable part of their strength for a period when, with more extended means, they might look to the attainment of greater objects. For the same cause, and with a view to the development of events, they consented to the Armistice.

In the mean time, the retreat of the Allies had, for the moment, given an appearance to the war which daily became more interesting to the Emperor, from the impossibility, if it should proceed, of his remaining an inactive spectator of it. The fate of the Prussian Monarchy was a point which peculiarly attracted the attention of his Majesty, feeling, as the Emperor did, that the restoration of the Prussian Monarchy was the first step towards that of the whole political system of Europe; and he viewed the danger in which she now stood as equally affecting himself. Already, in the month of April, had the Emperor Napoleon suggested to the Austrian Cabinet, that he considered the dissolution of the Prussian Monarchy as a natural consequence of her defection from France, and of the continuation of the war, — and that it now only depended upon Austria to add the most important and most flourishing of her provinces to its own State; a suggestion which shewed distinctly enough that no means could properly be neglected to save that Power. If this great

object could not be obtained by a just peace, it was necessary to support Russia and Prussia by a powerful co-operation. From this natural view of things, upon which even France could no longer deceive herself, his Majesty continued his preparations with unwearied activity. He quitted, in the early part of July, his residence, and proceeded to the vicinity of the scene of action, in order the more effectually to labour at the negotiation for peace, which still continued to be the object of his most ardent desires; and partly to be able the more effectually to conduct the preparations for war, if no other choice should remain for Austria.

A short time before, the Emperor Napoleon had declared, "that he had proposed a Congress, to be held at Prague, where Plenipotentiaries from France, the United States of North America, Denmark, the King of Spain, and the other Allied Princes on the one hand; and on the other, Plenipotentiaries of England, Russia, Prussia, the Spanish Insurgents, and the other Allies of this hostile mass, should meet, and lay the ground-work of a peace." To whom this proposition was addressed, in what manner, in what diplomatic form, through whose organ it could have been done, was perfectly unknown to the Austrian Cabinet, which only was made acquainted with the circumstance through the medium of the public prints. How, too, such a project could be brought to bear—how, from the combination of such dissimilar elements, without any generally acknowledged principle, without any previously regulated plan, a negotiation for peace was to be set on foot, was so little to be comprehended, that it was very allowable to consider the whole proposition rather as a play of the imagination, than as a serious invitation to the adoption of a great political measure.

Perfectly acquainted with all the obstacles to a general peace, Austria had long considered whether this distant and difficult object was not rather to be attained progressively; and in this opinion had expressed herself both to France and to Russia and Prussia, upon the subject of a Continental peace. *Not that the Austrian Court had misconceived, even for a moment, the necessity and importance of an Universal Peace among all the great Powers of Europe, and without which there was no hope of either*



*safety or happiness; OR, had imagined that the Continent could exist, if the separation of England were not invariably considered as a most deadly evil! The mediation which Austria proposed—after the alarming declaration of France had nearly destroyed all hopes of England uniting her endeavours in the attempt to procure a general peace—was an essential part of the great approaching negotiation for a general and effective Congress for Peace: it was intended, as preparatory to this, to draw up the preliminary articles of the future Treaty, to pave the way, by a long Continental Armistice, to a more extended and durable negotiation. Had the principle upon which Austria advanced been other than this, neither Russia nor Prussia, bound by the strongest ties to England, would certainly ever have listened to the proposals of the Austrian Cabinet.*

After the Russian and Prussian Courts, animated by a confidence in his Majesty highly flattering to the Emperor, had already declared their concurrence in the proposed Congress under the mediation of Austria, it became necessary to obtain the formal assent of the Emperor Napoleon, and to determine upon what principles the negotiations for peace were to be carried on. For this purpose his Imperial Majesty resolved, towards the end of the month of June, to send his Minister for Foreign Affairs to Dresden. The result of this mission was a Convention, concluded upon the 30th of June, accepting the mediation of his Imperial Majesty in the negotiation of a general, and, if that could not be effected, of a preliminary Continental peace. The city of Prague was fixed upon for the meeting of the Congress, and the 5th of July for the day of its opening. In order to obtain a sufficient time for the negotiation, it was determined by the same Convention that the Emperor Napoleon should not give notice of the rupture of the Armistice, which was to terminate on the 20th of July, at that time existing between himself and Russia, till the 10th of August; and his Majesty the Emperor took upon himself to obtain a similar Declaration from the Russian and Prussian Courts.

The points which had been determined in Dresden were hereupon imparted to the two Courts. Although the continuation of

the Armistice was attended with many objections, and with much serious inconvenience to them, the desire of giving to his Imperial Majesty another proof of their confidence—and at the same time to satisfy the world that they would not reject any prospect of Peace, however confined it might be, that they would not refuse any attempt which might prepare the way to it—overcame every consideration. The only alteration made in Convention of the 30th of June was, that the term of the opening the Congress, since the final regulations could not so soon be determined, should be deferred until the 12th of July.

*In the mean time, his Majesty, who would not as yet abandon all hopes of completely terminating by a general peace the sufferings of mankind and the convulsions of the political world, had also resolved upon a new attempt with the British Government. The Emperor Napoleon not only received the proposal with apparent approbation, but even voluntarily offered to expedite the business, by allowing the persons to be despatched for that purpose to England a passage through France. When it was to be carried into effect, unexpected difficulties arose, the passports were delayed from time to time, under trifling pretexts, and at length entirely refused. This proceeding afforded a fresh and important ground for entertaining just doubts as to the sincerity of the assurances which the Emperor Napoleon had more than once publicly expressed of his disposition to peace, although several of his expressions at that particular period afforded just reason to believe that a MARITIME PEACE was the object of his most anxious solicitude.*

During that interval, their Majesties the Emperor of Russia and the King of Prussia had nominated their Plenipotentiaries to the Congress, and had furnished them with very decisive instructions. On the 12th of July they both arrived at Prague, as well as his Majesty's Minister, charged with the concerns of the Mediation.

The negotiations were not to be protracted beyond the 10th of August, except in the event of their assuming such a character as to induce a confident hope of a favourable result. To that day the Armistice had been extended through the mediation of Austria: the political and military situation of the Allied Sovereigns, the

condition of the Countries they occupied, and their anxious wish to terminate an irksome period of uncertainty, prevented any further extension of it. With all these circumstances the Emperor Napoleon was acquainted; he well knew that the period of the negotiations was necessarily defined by that of the Armistice; and he could not moreover conceal from himself how much his own determinations would influence the happy abridgment and successful result of the pending negotiations.


It was therefore with real sorrow that his Majesty soon perceived, not only that no serious step was taken by France to accelerate this great work, but, on the contrary, it appeared as if a procrastination of the negotiations, and evasion of a favourable issue, had been decidedly intended. There was, indeed, a French Minister at the place of Congress, but without any orders to proceed to business, until the appearance of the first Plenipotentiary.

The arrival of that Plenipotentiary was in vain expected from day to day. Nor was it until the 21st of July that it was ascertained that a demur which took place on settling the renewal of the Armistice between the French and Russian and Prussian Commissioners,—an obstruction of very subordinate importance, having no influence whatever upon the Congress, and which might have been very easily and speedily removed by the interference of Austria,—was made use of as the justification of this extraordinary delay. And when this last pretext was removed, it was not until the 28th of July, sixteen days after that appointed for the opening of the Congress, that the first French Plenipotentiary arrived.

Even in the very first days after this Minister's arrival, no doubt remained as to the fate of the Congress. The form in which the full powers were to be delivered and the mutual explanations should be conducted, a point which had already been treated by all parties, became the object of a discussion which rendered all the endeavours of the mediating Power abortive. The apparent insufficiency of the powers entrusted to the French Negotiator occasioned a silence of several days. Nor was it until the 6th of August that this Minister gave in a new Declaration, by which the difficulties with respect to forms were by no means removed,

nor the negotiation by one step brought nearer to its object. After a useless exchange of notes upon every preliminary question, the 10th of August arrived. The Prussian and Russian Negotiators could not exceed this term; the Congress was at an end; and the resolution which Austria had to form was previously determined, by the progress of this negotiation—by the actual conviction of the impossibility of peace—by the no longer doubtful point of view in which his Majesty examined the great question in dispute—by the principles and intentions of the Allies, wherein the Emperor recognised his own—and, finally, by the former positive declarations, which left no room for misconception.

Not without sincere affliction, and alone consoled by the certainty that every means to avoid the war had been exhausted, does the Emperor now find himself compelled to action. For three years has his Majesty laboured with unceasing perseverance to effect, by mild and conciliatory measures, real and durable peace for Austria and for Europe. All his endeavours have failed: there is now no remedy, no recourse to be had but to arms. The Emperor takes them up without any personal animosity, from a painful necessity, from an irresistible duty, upon grounds which any faithful citizen of his realm, which the world, which the Emperor Napoleon himself, in a moment of tranquillity and reason, will acknowledge and justify. The necessity of this war is engraven in the heart of every Austrian, of every European, under whosoever dominion he may live, in such legible characters, that no art is necessary to distinguish them. The nation and the army will do their duty. An union established by common necessity, and by the mutual interest of every Power that is in arms for its independence, will give due weight to our exertions; and the result, with the assistance of Heaven, will be such as must fulfil the just expectations of every friend of Order and of Peace.



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